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You have some interesting ideas. But I’ve always found it rather bizarre that mutualists tend to ignore private security and oppression when devising their ideological models. As far as I can tell, the issue of force and capital accumulation are central to any mutualist free-market model.
I’ve never gotten a satisfactory response about this. The last mutualist I debated with said the question “didn’t interest him.”
What would you say re: capital accumulation as an Achilles’ heel of free-market mutualism?
I’m not sure I understand what you mean by the question, DF. If you’re referring to the alleged tendency of capital to accumulate in a few hands as winners are sorted out from losers, even in a non-capitalist market, you might check out the sidebar on Marxist critiques in Ch. 4 of HIR.
Thanks. I didn’t make it clear enough though: the other criticism was about private security forces, such as Xe Svcs (formerly Blackwater), and their potential value – particularly in the context of decentralized free markets – in determining “unfair” market conditions for their clients.
I think firms like Blackwater do a lot better in rigged corporatist markets where they can externalize a major part of their costs on the taxpayers. Under state capitalism, the enforcement costs of privilege are exogenous. When they’re endogenous — paid for by the beneficiaries — the cost of enforcing privilege is likely to exceed the benefit.
I don’t know if this will be anything you address in your book, but the other day I thought about the possibility of watchdog environmentalism, where people monitor pollution and habitat health with tools and protocols of their own (Surfrider Foundation comes to mind). Its more monitoring than “regulating,” but could lead to the latter.
Also, in regards to land management of property set aside for habitat conservation. Rather than having a state entity like DFG, the local community could ‘police’/regulate properties with patrols on perimeter trails, and wildlife cameras (which are set up monitor wildlife, and nab poachers).
Lastly, many operations like construction and manufacturing, for example, have certain specs or best practices for quality ‘control.’ “Inspectors” are usually employed to assure they are met. With proper documentation of the process via paper records and video, the need for inspections could be reduced, but I suppose the ultimate question is “who decides what specs and quality control are the standard by which certain things are to be built?” It doesn’t have to be the State, as many industries come up with their own or surpass the minimum set by the State.
May 28, 2011 at 6:05 pm |
Hey,
You have some interesting ideas. But I’ve always found it rather bizarre that mutualists tend to ignore private security and oppression when devising their ideological models. As far as I can tell, the issue of force and capital accumulation are central to any mutualist free-market model.
I’ve never gotten a satisfactory response about this. The last mutualist I debated with said the question “didn’t interest him.”
What would you say re: capital accumulation as an Achilles’ heel of free-market mutualism?
May 28, 2011 at 9:41 pm |
I’m not sure I understand what you mean by the question, DF. If you’re referring to the alleged tendency of capital to accumulate in a few hands as winners are sorted out from losers, even in a non-capitalist market, you might check out the sidebar on Marxist critiques in Ch. 4 of HIR.
May 28, 2011 at 9:52 pm |
Thanks. I didn’t make it clear enough though: the other criticism was about private security forces, such as Xe Svcs (formerly Blackwater), and their potential value – particularly in the context of decentralized free markets – in determining “unfair” market conditions for their clients.
May 28, 2011 at 11:04 pm |
I think firms like Blackwater do a lot better in rigged corporatist markets where they can externalize a major part of their costs on the taxpayers. Under state capitalism, the enforcement costs of privilege are exogenous. When they’re endogenous — paid for by the beneficiaries — the cost of enforcing privilege is likely to exceed the benefit.
December 18, 2011 at 1:35 pm |
I don’t know if this will be anything you address in your book, but the other day I thought about the possibility of watchdog environmentalism, where people monitor pollution and habitat health with tools and protocols of their own (Surfrider Foundation comes to mind). Its more monitoring than “regulating,” but could lead to the latter.
Also, in regards to land management of property set aside for habitat conservation. Rather than having a state entity like DFG, the local community could ‘police’/regulate properties with patrols on perimeter trails, and wildlife cameras (which are set up monitor wildlife, and nab poachers).
Lastly, many operations like construction and manufacturing, for example, have certain specs or best practices for quality ‘control.’ “Inspectors” are usually employed to assure they are met. With proper documentation of the process via paper records and video, the need for inspections could be reduced, but I suppose the ultimate question is “who decides what specs and quality control are the standard by which certain things are to be built?” It doesn’t have to be the State, as many industries come up with their own or surpass the minimum set by the State.
Looking forward to your book.
December 18, 2011 at 2:29 pm |
Thanks, EMM. That’s exactly the kind of stuff I want to use in Dekstop!